IISD contributes to sustainable development by advancing policy recommendations on international trade and investment, economic policy, climate change and energy, measurement and assessment, and natural resources management, and the enabling role of communication technologies in these areas. We report on international negotiations and disseminate knowledge gained through collaborative projects, resulting in more rigorous research, capacity building in developing countries, better networks spanning the North and the South, and better global connections between researchers, practitioners, citizens and policy-makers.
INTRODUCTION
The subsidies considered in this report relate to the underground mining of hard (bituminous) coal. 1 Other sectors of the coal industry in Poland also received state aid between 1990 and 2005 but not to an extent comparable with hard-coal mining. The subsidies were intended to help the industry make the transition from a command-and-control to a market-based system, while becoming internationally competitive.
The focus of this report is the period between 1990 and 2006. Before 1990, during the days of Communist rule, coal mining was also heavily supported by the state, but no reliable data on this period are available. Coal was regarded as the foundation of the country's economy, and to limit the cost of living, prices were fixed by the state. However, little effort was made to control costs. Since Poland's accession to the European Union in 2005, its coal-mining subsidies have been regulated according to EU law; the amount expected to be paid out through 2010 is shown in Table 1 . There are only two kinds of subsidies being paid at present: one for investment; and one to settle liabilities inherited form earlier periods. No state aid is given to support operating costs or to maintain access to already exploited coal reserves. During the period under investigation, the Polish hard-coal-mining sector received aid through several policy instruments, the majority of which are common subsidy types:
POLISH COAL-MINING RESTRUCTURING: A TIMELINE
• debt forgiveness;
• preferential tax rates;
• investment subsidies, such as tax write-offs or direct funds;
• funds to pay for social programs;
• funds to help cover the costs of closing mines; and • bank loans for working capital.
Detailed descriptions of the coal-mining restructuring process and subsidies for the period 1990-2006 are presented in the following sections of the report.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE RESTRUCTURING OF POLAND'S COAL-MINING INDUSTRY

THE USE OF COAL-MINING SUBSIDIES IN POLAND
Subsidies for coal mining were widespread in Europe until the mid-1990s when the coal industry faced increasing competitiveness from imports. Many arguments were used to justify these subsidies-mainly energy security, social stability and the dependence of related sectors on the continuance of coal mining (Frondel, Kambeck & Schmidt, 2007) . 2 In poorer or transitional countries, where electricity generated from fossil fuels represented a substantial share of total energy production, subsidies that frequently took the form of low coal prices 3 were justified as a way to moderate inflationary pressures. However, as an anti-inflationary policy it was poorly targeted; a 10 per cent increase in coal prices would lead to a 5 per cent increase in the cost of producing electricity in a coal-fired power station and a much smaller cost increase passed on to the consumer. 4 Poland is one of only a few countries in the world with a coal-based energy economy. Hard coal and lignite provide more than 55 per cent of Poland's primary energy supply, and 95 per cent of its electricity is generated from these fuels. Poland has a large domestic endowment of coal, but its heavy dependence on coal also has historical roots. During the period when its economy was centrally planned in particular, Poland had limited foreign exchange earnings with which it could import oil and natural gas. But because coal mining was considered one of the country's most important sectors, it was subsidized and coal prices were regulated to keep them affordable. The table below provides further information about Poland's coal sector. Policy, vol. 23, 1995, No. 6. 3 Coal costs are balanced by governmental subsidies, such as is the case in Ukraine.
FIGURE 1. POLAND COAL PRODUCTION 2008 exports decreased by 75%
4 The electricity price for the final consumer consists of the energy price as well as capital recovery and the cost of transmission and distribution fees, which together constitute a substantial share of total costs.
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Currently in Europe, only Germany still provides operating subsidies to its hard-coal sector, but these also are being phased out. The reasons and pace for their dismantling vary, but Germany has always had the opportunity of importing coal from politically stable countries. The subsidies discussed in this paper were intended not so much as to maintain the level of production, but to help the Polish coal-mining industry adjust to function more efficiently in an open-market economy by reducing employment and production capacity. Since neither single mines nor newly formed coal companies were able to incur restructuring costs, the state budget needed to support these efforts.
During the early 1990s, the once-wealthy coal sector started to experience the challenges of Poland's economic transition. Starting from a situation of over-employment, low productivity and poor economic conditions, the industry required immediate restructuring, which meant closing inefficient mines and those with few remaining coal reserves, as well as reducing employment at mines that were to keep operating. At first, there was an expectation that self-reliant commercial mining companies, now released from state control, would independently adapt to the new economic conditions. But continuation of the government's policy to control the domestic price of coal limited the industry's potential for income growth and nearly all mines experienced an increase in liabilities. The government supported some mining operations, but despite the state aid few mines were able to balance their accounts.
AIMS OF THE RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM
The overall objective of the subsidies was the improvement of the coal mines' economic and technical performance. Government documents articulated the following specific purposes:
• support the closing of unprofitable mines;
• reduce employment levels and thus improve labour productivity;
• adjust each mine's capacity to bring it into line with demand;
• more generally, make the mining sector profitable; and, ultimately, • turn the mining companies into commercial entities and then privatize them.
In Poland's case, the reasons for the industry's inefficiency were inherited from the command-andcontrol period's overcapacity and over-employment. The government's first attempt to address this problem through a restructuring program was in September 1991 (Government of Poland, 1991) ; the program was later amended, in May 1992. Mines were merged into companies operating under the same regulatory rules as were in place previously. Again, there was no substantial progress due to low prices for coal, and the strong bargaining position of the trade unions (of which there were typically 8-10 separate ones at each mine). Not surprisingly, the unions resisted all proposals to reduce wages or cut the number of jobs. In 1992, the initial subsidies targeted to mining operations were stopped, and only mine closures and employment reduction continued to be funded. This program also yielded no positive results.
The next program, launched in 1993, marked a substantial step forward. First, the mine-closure program finally became official policy; and, second, social programs to support employment reduction were established. However, earlier negligence had allowed the mining industry to sink into dire economic conditions, its outstanding debt reaching almost $4.5 billion U.S. by the end of 1994 (Table 2) . Nevertheless, the industry experienced a short period of profitability, thanks to a cyclical upsurge in coal prices.
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The government persisted with its restructuring, with subsequent programs in 1994, 1996 and 1997. These efforts were not successful mainly because the funds for mine closures were insufficient and the miners regarded the social programs as relatively unappealing. The program of 1996 forecasted that 5.2 billion zlotys (1996) ($2.35 billion in U.S. dollars of 2005) would need to be spent over five years (Table 3) . 
THE MAJOR POLICIES OF THE RESTRUCTURING PROGRAM
In 1998 the new government, which was supported by the Solidarity trade union election movement, formulated a new restructuring program. This time, it was formalized by a parliamentary bill (Parliament of Poland, 1998) , and because the trade unions' representatives were the main architects of the plan, organized labour raised few objections. The related suite of social programs, which envisaged various methods of helping dismissed miners, was central to the success of the new program.
Many of the key people on the mining restructuring teams had university backgrounds, including the person who was the first director of the State Coal Restructuring Agency and then vice-minister responsible for mining. There was some consultation among stakeholders but it was quite limited. The World Bank, which lent the funds for the restructuring, performed some economic analysis. Also, other foreign government sources supported studies on coal mining in Poland. Advanced methods such as modelling and scenario analysis were not used.
The subsidies foreseen in the 1998 program are listed in Table 4 . The differences in the structure of expenditures between the 1998 and previous programs are striking. The social program component constituted 60 per cent of the government outlays, whereas it had previously been only 19 per cent.
Overall expenditures under this program were almost 30 per cent greater than under the earlier programs. Ultimately, the government would support not only mine restructuring and social programs, but also the forgiveness of coal-company debts.
Also noteworthy were special provisions for pension funds which were actually repayments for coal due in-kind for pensioners. One of the traditional in-kind benefits for mining employees was free coal. When coal was a basic fuel for heating and warming water this benefit was a real help to miners, but as time passed more and more employees connected to distributed heating systems. For these employees, an amount of money equal to the in-kind coal had to be provided. This was especially important for lowincome pensioners. But the pension funds did not have adequate resources, so the money had to be supplied by the state budget and the budgets for mining restructuring. The amount was quite large, totalling 14 per cent of the total subsidy, or $335 million U.S. for the years 1998-2002. 
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SOCIAL PROGRAMS
The social programs were intended to bring about a reduction in employment without significantly reducing the dismissed workers' income or welfare. There were two groups of programs. The first was intended to redeploy younger coal workers elsewhere in the economy. The second provided welfare benefits to dismissed workers while they looked for a new job.
Social protection for older employees was provided in a form called "mining leave," and was reserved for those who had five or fewer years before they were eligible for a pension. The amount paid was 75 per cent of-"vacation wage"-i.e., the wage paid for normal leave. Retired workers maintained other benefits of employed workers such as receiving "coal in kind." If the person took a new job outside of mining the amount paid was reduced to 50 per cent.
Subject to approval from the relevant mining authority, each miner was entitled to choose from one of the following programs depending on their age:
• soft loans for the establishment of a business, or businesses that created jobs outside of mining;
• a social benefit of 65 per cent of the "vacation monthly wage" payment while the former employee searched for a new job, up to a maximum of 24 months; • a one-time payment equivalent to about 15 average months of wages, based on previous years (initially in 1998, and then the amount decreased to 7.2 average monthly wages in 2002) for those who left coal mining and became employed outside of mining within 24 months after being dismissed; and • a one-time payment for those employees who voluntarily left coal mining, initially equivalent to 24 months of the employee's previous average monthly wage, and then from 2002 equivalent to only 12 months at the average monthly wage.
Miners less than two years away from qualifying for their pension received guarantees of employment in their current or another mine. Also, workers from closed mines were offered alternative employment or access to active labour-market programs. To ease the transfer to other sectors, two employment agencies were established and their offices, located at each of the mines, offered training and other support to the workers.
Under the social program of 1998-2002, more than 53 000 workers left coal mining, of which 33 000 received some form of help. The actual reduction in employment was very close to what was planned. Most of the significant difference between the planned and actual net employment reduction can be attributed to "social benefit" which was one of the social programs. The "social benefit" policy was not widely accessed mainly because there were quite strict and cumbersome formal requirements for eligibility which, in some cases, made the program unattractive.
As illustrated by Table 4 , the pace of reduction fell over time, being large in the first two years and then declining as the reduction in 1998 and 1999 exceeded expectations by more than 15 000 (Karbownik & Bijanska, 2000 ) (see Figure 2 ). In the following years, the pace of employment reduction was in line with plans and no additional actions were deemed necessary.
Restructuring also involved local authorities, who were expected to play a key role in creating new employment opportunities for former miners. However, this part of the program enjoyed limited success, as local authorities were not properly prepared nor did they have much experience in creating jobs.
In 2003, Trybon and Szczepanski (2004) questioned former miners and found that a majority of them (between 57-85 per cent) had a positive view about their decision to abandon a job in mining. On the other hand, only 20-30 per cent considered their economic situation as good. Probably the most important factor explaining the relatively low assessment of their prospects is the simple fact that only 17 per cent of the former miners were high-school or university graduates. A majority had only vocational education specific to mining: that usually diminished their ability to be retrained for other jobs or to establish a successful business. However, as many as 54-65 per cent had found new jobs outside of mining and one-third of those interviewed had changed their profession. 
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CLOSING UNPROFITABLE MINES
Another measure undertaken to reduce mining costs was closing the most inefficient mines. Numerous mines had been in existence for more than 100 years and though their reserves were economically exhausted they continued to operate, extracting remnant reserves in tough mining conditions, usually at a high cost. The first restructuring activities merely involved the closing of such mines, either entirely or just the exhausted parts. In the case of partial closing, the remaining viable sections were merged with existing mines, which through the sharing of services helped reduce unit costs.
FIGURE 2. EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT REDUCTION, PERSONS
Source: calculations made by the author using data sourced from Karbownik, 2001; Karbownik and Turek, 2003 . Closing a mine requires funds for dismantling equipment and facilities, protecting the land above from subsistence, preventing potential accidents and managing the whole operation. Average closing costs were $21 million U.S. (2005) for 1 million metric tons of capacity, and increased by more than $9 million U.S. for each three-year extension granted to a closing operation (Karbownik, 2003) . A shorter closing time meant lower maintenance and management costs. In specific cases, maintaining some services, such as water pumping to prevent flooding neighbouring working mines, was required, and these costs were generally covered by the state budget. 
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Because the closing costs tended to be much larger than the profits of any coal mine or company, leaving restructuring to the coal companies alone would have resulted in prolonged, low-intensity actions, which would have proved to be more expensive in the long term. The experience of the first years of restructuring showed that subsidies from the state shortened the time period in which mines were closed and lowered the overall costs as a result.
DEBT MANAGEMENT
The third pillar of state support for mines was debt management. The previous policy of tolerating the economic inefficiency of mines for the sake of creating employment led to increasing debts and no serious attempts at their reduction in subsequent restructuring programs.
When the 1998 program was amended again in 1999, the government decided to address the industry's still significant outstanding debt. By the end of 1999, this debt totalled $6 billion U.S., a situation exacerbated by lower demand (as consumers turned to cleaner heating sources), increased imports and falling coal prices. The restructuring turned from a purely "technical" process to a predominantly "financial" one, with the main objective becoming debt management, as costs had been under control thanks to the reductions in mine employment and the closing of exhausted pits. Initially, the government assumed all debts related to the closing of coal mines as well as money owed to it in the form of unpaid income taxes, employment taxes, environmental charges and pension liabilities. The total sum of this debt forgiveness was approximately $440 million U.S. at the time.
Operating mines could delay debt payments until 2002, the year in which it was expected that mines would start to be profitable. Even though the increase in debt was nearly arrested, it was still about $5. 
ADDITIONAL MEASURES
Quotas on imported Russian steam coal had been established for the years 1999-2001 (there was no regulation thereafter) with the amount increasing from 690 000 to 760 000 metric tons. But even these quotas were poorly enforced, as importers often succeeded in getting the steam coal reclassified as coking coal, for which there was no import quota.
Apart from the aforementioned subsidies, there was a specific problem of supporting mining enterprise Kompania Weglowa PLC, the largest mining company in Europe, until it became profitable. When formed in 2003, this company struggled unsuccessfully to reach long-term viability, being a partnership of many inefficient and highly indebted mines. The state support was provided in the form of a direct transfer of funds as well as shares of state-owned companies, which were used as security for the bank loan.
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ASSESSING THE REFORM EFFORT
The main purpose of restructuring, and thus those subsidies to support the process, was to re-orient the mining industry from production maximization to profit maximization. That the period of restructuring and subsidization lasted so long was due primarily to the inability of governments to cope with the power of the trade unions and to avoid social tensions in the coal basin regions. Initially, in the early 1990s, the view was widespread, but not expressed officially, that coal miners should in some way repay the benefits they received under the command-and-control economy, such as access to special shops and special rights to buy goods that they enjoyed which were not available to the general public. On the other hand, miners were working seven days a week with only a few days off. Coal as the major source of convertible currencies had to be produced in the largest possible amount at any cost.
The world had little experience to offer on how to manage the transition of whole economies, and Poland, which formerly had developed heavy, energy-consuming industries, had to completely restructure its economy largely on its own. Coal mining was by no means the only industry affected, but its production was geographically concentrated and its labour traditions were deeply entrenched. Adverse outcomes were all too common-for example, when one large company went bankrupt, throwing a local city, previously reliant on the mine for employment, into poverty.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE RESTRUCTURING OF POLAND'S COAL-MINING INDUSTRY
LESSONS LEARNED
By the end of the restructuring process, of Poland's three major coal basins, Lower Silesian was closed completely; Upper Silesian had reduced its production substantially; and Lublin Basin, with only one mine, but a very efficient one, was expanding its capacity. Coal companies still have old debts to pay, and repeated laws relating to the extension of repayment periods prove that the restructuring was not fully successful. There have been periods of profitability, mainly thanks to high prices on international markets, but the current low prices and increasing imports from Russia pose a growing threat to the economic viability of hard-coal mining in Poland.
All the government's goals except its final one-commercializing and then privatizing the mining companies-were, at least partially, fulfilled during the restructuring process. It was not until 2009 that shares in a mine were finally sold to private investors.
Government expenditures on coal-mining restructuring are estimated to have totalled some $9.3 billion U.S. from 1990 through 2006 (Table 6) . 5 Subsidies were comparatively high in the early 1990s, but these were the first years of transition from the command-and-control legacy and the country was experiencing hyper-inflation (680 per cent in 1990). No explicit subsidy was provided to cover operating costs, though the government forgave debts totalling some $5.2 billion U.S., of which $4.9 billion U.S. was provided in one year (2003)-an enormous amount considering the small size of the state budget. Because these debts had been created through regular mining operations, relief from them could be considered an operational subsidy.
The program was initially very successful in terms of reducing employment and adjusting to demand by closing unprofitable mines. By the end of 1998, the number of employed had been reduced by 35000 people, or 45 per cent more than anticipated when the program was conceived. Annual capacity reduction was reduced by 3.7 million metric tons as opposed to the anticipated 1 million metric tons.
The experience of Poland's coal-mining restructuring is a tale of dilatory decisions and lost opportunities. The policies applied in the early 1990s mainly served to keep inefficient mines open and maintain the mining jobs. Subsequent programs-half measures for mine closing and social programs, insufficiently funded-were only partially successful. Had more decisive measures pursued under the 1998 program been started earlier, the aim of facilitating the adjustment of coal mining to market-economy conditions would have stood a better chance. It would have also helped to transform company towns reliant on the coal-mining sector into more economically diversified communities.
The origin of the restructuring problems was the challenge of retraining miners for jobs in other sectors that were themselves shedding labour. 6 Another contributing factor, especially early on, was the tendency of the government to intervene to control prices as an anti-inflation measure. The resulting economic inefficiency made it difficult to find funds for social or closing programs and, finally, state subsidies were necessary. It is doubtful whether in any case the mines would have been able to cover all the costs of these programs, but the subsidies required would have been smaller had the restructuring begun earlier.
The social program of 1998, which helped achieve a significant reduction of employment, worked toward achieving efficiencies in operating mines that are now close to viable.
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The measures undertaken between 1990 and 2005 at least took the industry in the right direction. However, they seem to have mainly benefited the coal miners, and of course the communities located near mines that managed to maintain their traditional levels of employment (in some cases, for years). At the beginning of the economic transition, the miners were able to hold onto their jobs, even while other companies without comparable subsidies went bankrupt. The restructuring law of 1998 gave miners substantial sums to encourage them to leave the industry. Most other industries did not fare as well. Ultimately, the burden of the restructuring fell on Polish taxpayers, who underwrote not only the restructuring (i.e., mines closing and employment reduction) but also debt relief.
Poland's coal-mining restructuring merits further study of its advantages, disadvantages, errors and successes. Most of the papers written and research conducted on this period note only the quantitative manifestations. Two reports stand out: one on a history of restructuring (Szlązak, 2004) which also explains reasons of their failures in early years 7 ; and a second one (Ney, 2006) that analyzes restructuring in a statistical way that validates the restructuring effort. The programs were monitored in the years 2000-2007 by the government or responsible agency, but again the comments or literature on the issue are limited to simple statements on the restructuring process.
The general public apparently understood the need for restructuring and there were no significant objections against spending money on social programs. However, after the success of the mining social programs, other industries that had to undergo restructuring (e.g., steel) asked for similar benefits as had been afforded the mining sector.
Since closing costs received a significant share of subsidies, a special fund was established in 2000 to which mines contribute a percentage of the amortized costs. The mines' contribution is calculated basing on their total amortization (depreciation) costs. This should collect funds to assist in meeting the future closing costs for mines being wound down. There are also doubts as to whether the extent of mine closures and capacity reduction was necessary given the current economic situation. Mining was not capable of benefiting fully from the recent rise in coal prices because of reduced capacity and limited 
potential for growth in the short term. The current shortage in domestic supply raises the question as to whether some of the inefficient mines should have been closed only temporarily as opposed to permanently. That would have likely cost less than to construct new mines or expand existing ones as is now being considered.
The initial negligence of coal-mine restructuring could be partially attributed to the inability of the Polish government to devote adequate funds to the restructuring. Also, the view that "the invisible hand of the market" would force industries to adjust to market conditions was popular. Continuous failures finally convinced decision-makers to foster the restructuring and change the policy. There are doubts, however, as to whether the restructuring was a success. Coal companies still have debts to pay, and they may have reduced the economic efficiency of some mines during the 2008-09 economic crisis.
The experience of Polish coal mining may be typical of declining industries or sectors in a transitional economy. Decreasing demand, increased competition from other suppliers and high costs lead to continuously diminishing economic efficiency. One simple lesson is that such an industry often cannot improve exclusively through its own efforts. Social tensions, the resistance of trade unions and local communities' fear of losing jobs are obstacles that cannot be overcome without support from outside the industry. It also seems that slow, step-by-step restructuring without rigid controls being placed on the industry is not a viable option. Only significant effort supported by well designed and targeted subsides, social acceptance and a robust legal framework could improve the sector's performance.
